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Globalisation, international coalitions, and domestic reform 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper considers the impact of China’s insertion into the global political economy on 
the nature of political power. It argues that for most of the period of the transition from 
socialism, state leaders attempted to protect domestic interests where possible from the 
perceived detrimental impacts of globalisation. However, China’s entry into the WTO 
marked a key shift in this strategy. Through the creation of an international coalition for 
reform, key state leaders used WTO entry as a tool to enforce change on reluctant 
domestic constituents, rather than the previous strategy of protecting them from 
competition and change. While many of the changes to the Chinese regime have emerged 
as a result of domestic reform, external actors and interests have played an important role 
in altering the fundamentals of politics in the PRC, and in particular, changing the raison 
d’etre of communist party rule. 
 
Level One Heading - Introduction 
In many respects, studying China’s political economy in the pre reform era was much 
simpler than it is today. To be sure, China was never a purely totalitarian state, and there 
considerable time and effort was spent by analysts trying to find the real locus of power, 
with particular emphasis on elite factionalism, the role of the military, and the power of 
provincial leaders. And of course, China’s leaders always had relations with the 
superpowers in mind when defining domestic development strategies. Nevertheless, the 
increasingly autarkic nature of Chinese politics made it possible to study China’s 
political economy almost entirely in domestic terms. 
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 With China’s re-engagement with the global economy in the post-Mao era, and 
particularly after Deng Xiaoping’s southern inspection tour (南巡) in 1992, such a 
domestic focus can no longer be efficacious. This is not to say that the domestic context 
is unimportant – far from it. Domestic considerations must remain crucial for any 
understanding of the contemporary political economy. It is just that on its own, domestic 
issues do not let us truly understand the many dynamics at play. Trying to get to grips 
with the domestic context of reform is hard enough in itself, but the rather daunting 
reality for students of contemporary China is that it is now essential to also get to grips 
with the dynamics and workings of the global political economy as well.  
 
This paper considers way in which ‘the new hierarchies of the global economy cut across 
regional and national boundaries’ (Gamble et al 1996 : 10) have impacted on the 
functioning of the Chinese state. Two specific cases warrant specific attention here; first, 
a capital accumulation strategy that has placed a high importance on attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to generate export growth, and second, China’s entry into the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). Whilst both of these cases originate primarily from 
internal political decisions, the resulting economic dynamics of China’s insertion into the 
global economy have fundamentally influenced the evolution of economic and political 
process in China, that have ultimately altered the entire basis of the power of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). 
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Level One heading - Studying China in an Era of Globalisation 
The authors in this special collection all utilise political economy approaches of various 
varieties to consider the relationship between globalisation and political regimes in the 
region. But this does not necessarily mean that we can simply apply one size fits all 
models of political economy to understand the impact of globalisation on China. Indeed, 
the IPE discipline displays many elements of epistemological ethnocentrism. By this, I 
mean that much of this literature is based on understandings that are predicated on 
conceptions of the role of the state in the contemporary world that is based on the 
experience of advanced industrialised democracies. For example, even in some of the 
best works on comparative capitalisms, the emphasis remains on comparing advanced 
industrialised economies1. While these works serve a very useful purpose in exposing the 
varieties of capitalism within advanced industrialised societies, the lack of analyses of 
less developed economies is marked.  
 
In particular, we need to pay close attention to understandings of the division between 
state and market, and between the public and the private, that underpins much IPE 
analysis of and in the developed world. Van Wolferen (1990), for example, has long 
argued that analysts from the ‘west’ fail to understand Japan because they start with false 
assumptions. The concept of a separation between ‘public’ and ‘private’ that lies at the 
heart of some investigations of political economy is, according to van Wolferen, absent in 
Japan. For Deans (1997 : 17-43), this is a consequence both of ‘both the traditional 
understanding of ‘economy’ in East Asia and the way in which market economies were 
established there’.  
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 In a similar vein, the concept of neo-patrimonialism has been deployed to explain the 
blurring of public and private in many contemporary African states. While Weber’s 
conception of traditional patrimonialism saw no distinction between public and private, 
in the new-patrimonial states, a formal distinction exists based on institutionalised state 
system underpinned by laws rules and regulations. But despite this formalised separation, 
of public and private, this separation is not reflected in the action of political leaders who 
continue to utilise and dispense public resources – not least because it is much harder to 
change practices and cultures that it is to change laws. As these political leaders are not 
only the utilisers of public resources, but  also the regulators, there is weak state capacity 
to enforce control, usually accompanied by weak civil society to act as check and balance 
on power.  
 
Level Two Heading –Public and Private and the Chinese Financial System  
The neo-patrimonial approach is most often used to explain the significance of patronage, 
clientelism and corruption in modern African states (Bratton and de Walle, 1994; Tangri, 
1999). Space forbids a consideration of the relationship between economic reform and 
corruption in contemporary China in this paper. However, it is worth noting that holding 
political office has allowed thousands of corrupt Chinese officials to capture the market 
and to utilise public resources for private gain. But more important for this paper, the 
neo-patrimonial approach draws attention to the fact that despite formal legal changes, 
the legal separation of public and private in China has not always been recognised by 
political leaders (particularly at the local level), even when they are not acting for purely 
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private gain. Perhaps the best example here is the way that the financial system has been 
used in large parts of China to provide many of the employment/welfare related  
functions previously funded by state-planning.  
 
In 1994, Zhu Rongji introduced a number of reforms intended to bring down inflation 
and to increase the central government’s control over fiscal resources. In earlier periods 
of reform, the central leadership had deliberately and consciously created a link between 
local collection and control of finances in an attempt to unlock local initiative as a spur to 
economic growth. But while this move did indeed act as a key impulse for economic 
growth, the extent to which the localities increased their share of national fiscal revenues 
vis-à-vis the central government ‘caught officials in China by surprise’ (Wong, 1991: 
690).  
 
Thus, a new taxation was introduced which immediately increased both the total amount 
of all fiscal revenues, and the proportion accruing to the central authorities (which 
immediately rose around 30 per cent to around 50 per cent of all fiscal revenues)2 (Zheng 
1999: 1168-9). On the face of it, then, the fiscal reforms were successful in that they 
increased the total volume of fiscal resources. More important, they partially redressed 
what the central leadership perceived to be a structural imbalance in the division of 
finances between centre and locality. However, local authorities have been highly 
innovative in finding new ways of funding local projects, and maintaining local 
employment through the provision of quasi-public investment in loss making enterprises.  
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On one level, they have developed new forms of ‘extra system’ revenue, which Gao 
Peiyong (1999: 41) defines as ‘revenues whose regulations are formulated independently 
by various departments and localities and which are collected and disposed of by them as 
well’. The biggest source of extra system income is fees to the extent that tax revenues 
now account for less than half of all revenues collected by government institutions at 
local and national levels combined. On another, local authorities have continued to 
exercise leverage and often downright control over local financial institutions. Here we 
need to focus on the notion of dual control of local level organisation in China. 
Administrative organisation is built on twin and simultaneous functional and geographic 
channels. Thus, a provincial branch of a bank is vertically responsible to the bank's 
central offices, and ultimately to the Ministry of Finance. But at the same time, it is also 
responsible to the provincial finance bureau and the provincial government. The latter 
has the advantage of hands on contact with the branch, since it is in direct day-to-day 
contact with bank officials. Furthermore, it possesses considerable power in terms of 
allocating goods, services and personnel to the banks. Thus, while not formally an agency 
of local government, local branches of banks often act as if they are part of the local 
government structure. In addition, there are over 200 locally controlled International 
Trust and Investment Corporations (ITIC) which borrow money on international markets 
to fund domestic investment  projects, and over 50,000 small scale locally controlled 
rural and urban credit cooperatives in China today. And as access to capital remains more 
dependent on government influence than financial prudence, we can consider loans from 
these institutions to be ‘para-fiscal’ investment (Wang, Liu and Liu, 1999: 6) and can be 
considered to be quasi-government debt. 
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 The central government has responded to the situation, abolishing 49 local branches of 
the People’s Bank of China in 1998 to ‘set free state-owned commercial banks from the 
intervention of local government’ (Xie Ping, 1999: 4), allowing the heavily indebted 
Guangdong ITIC to go bust and ordering the restructuring of credit cooperatives. But the 
key point for this paper is that in the process of the transition from socialism, local 
leaders have utilised both public and quasi-private resources to provide a soft-landing for 
those who stand to lose most from economic reform. The desire for rapid economic 
growth has been tempered by a concern of the impact on social stability of potentially 
declining rural incomes, and increased urban unemployment. And although the example 
of local control over financial resources is largely a consequence of domestic economic 
reform, it is also related to China’s insertion into the global economy, and the perceived 
detrimental impacts of globalisation on the stability of the Chinese state and society. 
Here, we focus on how the Chinese leadership has attempted to square two apparently 
contradictory sets of understandings. First, that insertion in, and reliance on, the global 
economy is the quickest and easiest way of generating of economic growth in China; and 
second, that such integration with the global economy might provide serious challenges 
to wealth, employment and social stability.  
 
Level One Heading - Globalising While Defending 
At the risk of oversimplification, we can divide China’s relationship with economic 
globalisation into four main phases. The first, from 1978 to 1986 marked a very gradual 
opening of only parts of China to the global economy. Following the Third Plenum of the 
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11th Central Committee in 1978, China opened four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) with 
the (limited) freedom to conduct international economic relations3. At the Fifth National 
People’s Congress in July 1979, the government passed a supporting law which provided 
a legal basis for the existence of joint ventures and foreign investment. The initial success 
of these SEZs in attracting investment resulted in considerable lobbying from other 
coastal cities to be allowed the same access to the global economy, and a further 14 
coastal cities were ‘opened up’ in 1984 (Hamrin, 1990: 83). 
 
The second key change came in 1986, with what has now come to be known as the 
‘twenty-two regulations’. These regulations created a more beneficial environment for 
foreign investors including lower fees for labour and rent, tax rebates for exporters, and 
made it possible for foreign companies to convert the Renminbi (RMB)4 into foreign 
exchange and repatriate profits. It also extended the joint venture contracts beyond the 
original 50-year limit, and created a legal basis for wholly foreign owned enterprises 
(rather that investors having to sign a joint venture with a Chinese partner). This move 
considerably increased the attraction of investing in China to produce exports for other 
markets. While foreign invested enterprises only accounted for two per cent of exports 
and six per cent of imports before 1986, the figure increased to 48 per cent and 52 per 
cent respectively by 2000 (Braunstein and Epstein, 2002: 23). 
 
The third key change came in 1992. From 1989, Premier Li Peng instituted a 
retrenchment policy with a limited reversal of reform in an attempt to bring inflation 
under control. China’s international image was also somewhat tarnished (to say the least) 
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by the 1989 Tiananmen incident, and the resulting conservative wind in policy. In a tour 
of southern China in 1992 (the nan xun 南巡) Deng Xiaoping effectively set policy in an 
ad hoc manner praising the emergence of proto-capitalist practices in open areas and 
calling for a new policy of rapid economic reform and further opening. Following Deng’s 
exhortations, the Party Congress in October 1992 formally declared that China now had a 
‘socialist market economy’. As with the original decision to open China at the 1978 
Third Plenum, the key issue here is the ideational change promoted by key leaders to 
pursue a more open and marketised strategy, rather than specific legal changes.  
 
In many respects, it was only in 1993 that China began to emerge as a global trading 
power. From 1993, exports increased by 60 per cent in two years (53 per cent in real 
terms), and doubled in the space of five years5.  In the process, a US$12.2 billion trade 
deficit in 1993 was transformed into a US$5.4 billion surplus the following year, with the 
trade surplus rising to US$40.3 billion in 1997. And it is no coincidence that 1993 also 
marked the emergence of China as a major recipient of FDI – indeed there was more FDI 
into China in 1993 than in the entire preceding fourteen years of reform put together. The 
fourth and to date unfinished stage began with China’s entry into the (WTO) at the Dohar 
Ministerial round of 2001 – a key turning point that we will return to later in this paper.   
 
Prior to WTO entry at least, the strategy of dealing with globalisation was to protect 
domestic actors from international competition whilst simultaneously attempting to reap 
the benefits of globalisation. To this end, China constructed a remarkably liberal 
internationalised export regime built on encouraging FDI to produce exports for external 
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markets - indeed, as China joined the WTO entry, some 60 per cent of all imports came 
into China tariff free in the form of components that were processed and subsequently re-
exported as finished goods (Lardy, 1998, 2002). But this liberal export regime sat 
alongside a relatively closed and protected domestic trading regime designed to protect 
domestic producers from competition. As such, any analyses of Chinese trade should 
start by following Naughton (2000) and dividing the focus of analyses into two. China’s 
insertion into the global economy was largely achieved without a concomitant insertion 
of the global economy into China. On one level, this provided the Chinese economy with 
strong defences against the dangers of financial globalisation. Commenting on why 
China did not suffer during the 1997 financial crises, Yu Yongding (1995: 15) argued 
that: 
 ‘For many years, observers have criticized China’s slowness in developing 
financial markets and liberalizing its capital account. The Chinese government 
itself was also worried by the slow progress. Rather theatrically, the disadvantage 
has turned into advantage. Owing to capital controls and the underdevelopment of 
financial markets and the lack of sophisticated financial instruments, such as 
stock futures and foreign exchange forwards, RMB escaped the attack by 
international speculators’ 
 
On another, vulnerable economic sectors were shielded from the impact of international 
competition. Of course, there is a strong school of though that argues that protection from 
competition does more harm than good in the long term – an issue we shall return to later 
– but in the short term at least, protection allowed the government to deal with the impact 
on incomes and employment that emerged from domestic reform without having to deal 
with the simultaneous impact of international competition and  globalisation.  
 
 10
And it is through insertion into the global economy that the Chinese economy has 
continued to grow so quickly even during periods when the domestic demand and 
expansion has been sluggish and even negative6. With investment into the USA declining 
sharply in 2002, China became the worlds largest recipient of non-stocks and shares FDI, 
reaching a new high of US$53.5 billion in 2003. As the vast majority of this investment 
uses China as a production platform for exports to other states, it has helped promote 
China to the position of the world’s fourth biggest exporter, helped generate a foreign 
exchange surplus of US$26 billion, and contributed to foreign currency reserves second 
only to Japan at US$403.3 billion (and this was after US$45 billion had been used to  
recapitalise state banks). 
 
Level Two Heading – Globalisation, Nationalism and Hegemony 
  
The economic logic of embracing economic globalisation – albeit with considerable state 
efforts to limit the impact of globalisation on China – appears to be compelling. But not 
all in China (or elsewhere) are totally convinced. This is partly because of fears that 
Chinese growth has become too dependent on exogenous factors – on the investment 
decisions of foreign companies, and on demand in external markets. An imbalance has 
occurred between endogenous demand and growth and exogenous demand and growth. 
More important are those voices that point to the political spillovers of economic 
globalisation, and the association of globalisation with hegemony. Here the emphasis is 
on the geometric problem of triangles that only have two points. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union means that the balance disappeared, and the US was now free to impose its 
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hegemony 7  over the international system in general, and China in particular – a 
hegemony which is deployed to prevent China’s development. 
 
This understanding is not simply confined to military conceptions of hegemony. The 
‘new American hegemony’ (Zhou周,2002) includes a wide range of features. On one 
level, there is the danger of  broadly defined ‘cultural hegemony’ (Liu 刘 , 2002). 
‘Culture’ here does not just refer to the spread of the MacDonalds/CNN culture across 
the world, but a wider conception of culture that includes political values and norms in 
such realms as human rights and democratisation (Wang, 1999). Yang (杨1999) argues 
that this form of hegemony represents a new type of warfare. This warfare is not just 
constrained to bringing other countries under the US security umbrella, and providing 
military capabilities to allies, but also contains a strong economic dimension. Through 
bilateral pressures such as restricting access to the US market, and through US power in 
the international financial institution, US power and hegemony can be imposed on the 
world and developing states in particular without the use of brute military power. 
 
We should note here that this conception of US as the global hegemon is not simply 
limited to academic and policy circles. Popular perceptions of the US in China can be 
contradictory. On one level, there is an aspirational element – many young urban Chinese 
like the trappings of American culture, and the US remains the number one choice if 
people can emigrate or be educated abroad. But at the same time, there is deep popular 
hostility to the US which is seen as trying to enforce unfair change on China in an 
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attempt to block China’s economic development, and to prevent China from attaining its 
‘rightful’ place as a world power.  
 
This anti-Americanism has been most vocally aired when the US has militarily come into 
contact with China – once with the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and 
again when a US spy plane collided with a PLAAF plane over Hainan. But this hostility, 
or at least suspicion, lies not too far below the surface during less turbulent times. There 
is considerable popular support for nationalist and even xenophobic stances – to the 
extent that the CCP often finds it difficult to keep the lid on the ant-Americanism that the 
leadership itself often espouses. ‘Sino-American Rivalry 中美较量大写真’ argued that US 
policy to contain China was doomed to fail in the face of a newly powerful and resurgent 
China (Chen陈et al, 1996). This was followed by the publication of two highly popular 
texts by Song Qiang 宋 强et al (1996a, 1996b). The first, ‘China Can say No 中国可以说
不’ railed against the US as the self-imposed imposer of international norms, and the self-
imposed adjudicator of right and wrong. China was a great civilisation which should 
resist American hegemony and strive to exert itself over the global hegemon8. In 1997, 
Liu Kang刘康et al (1997) produced ‘Behind the Demonisation of China 妖魔化中国的背后’ 
which similarly argued that Western powers (essentially short-hand for the US), were 
trying to force western cultures and values on developing countries like China, through 
the expansion of western media into the developing world. 
 
Hughes (1997) has argued, there is an inherent tension or contradiction within China 
between nationalism and globalisation. Chinese Marxism was always as much about 
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China as it was about Marxism. National salvation and reconstruction were an important 
part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) popular appeal, and in many respects 
Marxism and the CCP were seen as a means of restoring China to its rightful place in the 
World rather than a vehicle for creating a classless society. With the Marxist elements of 
ideology now all but redundant, the CCP has promoted itself as the defenders of China’s 
national interests (interests that it itself largely defines) in the face of a hostile and 
hegemonic West, with the West most often identified with the United States.  
 
There was and is a recognition that China needs to engage with the global economy in 
order to attain economic growth objectives. But at the same time, there is a concern that 
increased economic integration would increase China’s vulnerability to economic 
pressures – not just over economic issues, but also in terms of major actors (particularly 
the US) using economic levers to pressure China on political and security issues. Thus, 
divisions emerged within the leadership between those emphasising the logic of 
economic transformation, and those who argued that traditionally conceived national 
security issues should take predominance.  
 
For Harris (2001) the Chinese 1998 White Paper on Defence marks a key turning point. 
The White Paper reinterpreted conceptions of national security to place a much greater 
emphasis on the need for ‘economic security’. Crucially, economic security for China, 
given the importance of exogenous demand for domestic growth, entailed securing 
permanent  access to the US  market once and for all – one of the key considerations in 
inspiring Chinese efforts to join the WTO.  
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 Level One Heading - Globalisation and External Pressure to Change 
The rapid growth of China as a global exporter – and in particular, the size of the Chinese 
trade surplus with the US and other developed states - has perhaps inevitably brought 
external pressure for China to reform its dualistic structure and to behave by ‘fairer’ 
international rules. Critics pointed to the high level of Chinese tariffs; the limitation of 
trading rights through quotas and regulated access to ‘closed’ sectors of the Chinese 
economy; the high level of subsidies provided to support domestic Chinese exporters, 
agricultural producers, and loss making enterprises;  the lack of price reform, which 
allowed favoured domestic producers to purchase inputs below the real market cost, 
while foreign companies in China which pay the market price for the same inputs; 
incomplete currency convertibility; the lack of transparency in China's policy making; 
intellectual and property right infringement; and the differential application of fiscal 
system where local companies typically negotiated tax free deals with the local 
government.  
 
As Lardy has demonstrated, the Chinese authorities did much to reduce formal barriers to 
trade well before WTO entry, bringing average tariff rates down from around 50 per cent 
in the early 1980s to 17 per cent in 1998: 
There also has been an impressive reduction in the use of nontariff barriers to 
restrict imports. Today [2000] the number of tariff lines subject to licenses and 
quotas has been reduced by 80 percent in comparison with 1992. These 
restrictions now apply to less than 4 percent of all import tariff lines. (Lardy, 
2000) 
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Nevertheless, China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 entailed the provision of ever more 
concessions to the global economy, and marked a key watershed in the relationship 
between the Chinese state and globalisation.  
 
Level Two Heading - WTO Entry 
In joining the WTO in 2001, Chinese authorities agreed to give up give up many of the 
mechanisms that had been used to protect domestic actors in previous years. I have 
discussed the process of negotiating entry and the specifics of the Chinese conditions 
elsewhere (Breslin 2003). Here I simply repeat my assertion that the accession protocol 
formalising Chinese entry entailed significant concessions far exceeding the obligations 
of previous new developing nations – and many of the concessions even exceeded those 
required of developed nations.  
 
This is partly because of the isolation of Chinese negotiators from their own colleagues in 
Beijing and the rest of China. Any researcher who interviews Chinese officials and 
academics will be told that Long Yongtu and other negotiators were isolated from other 
political elites within China. They didn’t discuss their negotiations with other interested 
parties in China, but instead became embroiled in the process of finding agreement with 
their foreign counterparts. The suggestion is that the process became a ‘one-level game’, 
with the need to come to an agreement with negotiating partners – the international game 
- overriding the need to ensure that the domestic Chinese constituents were happy with 
any concessions – the domestic game.  
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It is also true that the importance of exogenous demand for Chinese growth placed a 
premium on ensuring access to the major markets in the developed world. Prior to WTO 
entry, access to the US market had only been guaranteed on an annual basis to approve 
MFN status to China in the US House of Congress. While this vote had always gone in 
China’s favour, there were at times quite bitter debates in Congress (perhaps most 
notably in 1997). Of course it might be mere coincidence that the Chinese leadership 
pushed for US acceptance for Chinese entry in the year that George W Bush was elected 
US President, but it perhaps should be noted that the Bush team were heavily critical of 
Clinton’s ‘appeasement’ of China during the election campaign. 
 
But perhaps to really understand why China entered the WTO on the terms that it did, we 
need to return to the debate over the wisdom of protecting domestic interests noted 
above. In considering the relationship between the state and globalisation, many Chinese 
leaders perceived protecting domestic actors as the solution. For Zhu Rongji it was the 
problem. Protecting domestic sectors was preventing the full and final transition away 
from socialism, and allowed local state actors in particular to reinvent elements of the 
plan through their control over local financial resources. Unable to successfully push 
reform through domestic channels, the task of promoting domestic reform was instead 
placed in the hands of the WTO.  
 
And the major players within the WTO were more than happy to use the occasion to 
influence reform on China. Clearly, they would not allow Chinese entry on any terms – 
Washington’s rejection of Zhu Rongji’s initial concessions in the Spring of 1999, and the 
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long time it took to negotiate the specifics of Chinese entry after 1999 bear testimony to 
the fact that entry could not just be on China’s terms. But considerations of the impact of 
Chinese entry were also based on liberal understandings of international relations. US 
and European actors were keen to lock China into the world system and to lock it into a 
liberalisation agenda – partly as this directly benefits the developed world in the short 
term, and partly because they believed it would generate domestic change in China. This 
change would first manifest itself in increased economic freedom, but would ultimately 
lead to change in other arenas, promoting political and social change and leading to 
China’s conformity with global rules and norms.  
 
Level Two Heading - Implementing WTO Criteria 
Signing the WTO agreement was one thing. Implementing the resulting concessions is en 
entirely different matter. It is still too early to make any definitive statements about 
Chinese compliance – though this has not prevented many from making such statements 
and assessments. For those who suggest that compliance will be far from easy, four re-
occurring themes tend to crop up. First, we return to the idea of WTO entry negotiations 
as a one-level game. Due to the lack of consultation between the negotiators and 
stakeholders within China, there was and still remains a huge amount of ignorance within 
Chinese elites over what the entry requirements actually mean for them. In February 
2002, a leading trade official in what was then the State Economic and Trade 
Commission told said that none of the staff understood what the implications would be 
for them9. The second related theme is that there remains considerable opposition from 
within China – and even at high levels – to the terms of the agreement: ‘the accession 
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process was guided by a small number of top government leaders and that 
implementation relies on lower-level officials, many of whom oppose changes affecting 
their bureaucratic power base.’ (Wall Street Journal, 2003) 
 
Kynge (2002) argues that ‘the regulatory agencies who often regard themselves as the 
protector of domestic companies rather than the regulator’ have played a particularly 
important role in ‘interpreting’ WTO agreements in ways that allow more protection for 
domestic producers that was originally intended. This has resulted in ‘a dense web of 
Chinese regulations’ (Dougherty, 2002) which in some cases has undermined the 
liberalising logic of the WTO agreement: 
China has started to release regulations to open up industries 
according to its obligations under the WTO. But often those regulations 
are accompanied by whole sets of new limitations that virtually reverse 
the promise of opening up. It is one page of opening up and fifteen pages 
of trying to reverse it’ (China Biz, 2002) 
 
According to Stratford (2002) , this process of overturning original intentions takes three 
forms – ‘legitimate (though unwelcome) exploitations of ‘loopholes’’, ‘China's 
aggressive interpretations of ambiguous language’, and ‘blatant disregard for clear-cut 
obligations’. 
 
Third, many external observers express surprise that the Chinese negotiators agreed to 
forgo so many means of protecting vulnerable sectors, and point to the fact that policy 
reversals are inevitable if social stability is to be secured. For example, a survey of US 
companies operating in China found that most expected that the social costs of 
implementing the requirements would be so great that the Chinese would find it 
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extremely difficult to implement all obligations. This was not so much a complaint by the 
respondents as a simple statement of fact (USGAO, 2002). In many ways, the whole 
point of joining the WTO was to ensure that leadership changes could not alter the 
general orientation of policy. But the evidence of the post-Zhu Rongji leadership 
suggests some changes in policy, if not a reversal of overall trends. Wen and Hu appear 
to be placing a greater emphasis on helping those who have lost out during the transition 
from socialism than their predecessors, and this might have to include protecting those 
who stand to lose in the wake of WTO entry (Lieberthal, 2003). 
 
The fourth and final theme returns us to the issue local power holders, and an 
understanding of the location of power within the Chinese state system. WTO entry 
might have been in part intended to use external pressure to enforce change on resistant 
local power holders, but this does not necessarily mean that they will comply. In a 
congressional briefing paper, Morrison (2002) argues that ‘Corruption and local 
protectionism are rampant in China, and gaining the cooperation of local officials and 
government bureaucrats that oversee various affected industries could prove difficult in 
the short run’. It might not be impossible for the central government to ensure 
compliance in the provinces, but it is a far from easy task. 
 
So we should be wary of assuming that WTO entry has massively reduced the capacity of 
the Chinese leadership to control its own economic destiny in the face of WTO inspired 
liberalisation agendas. We should also be wary of asserting that WTO entry has 
depoliticised Sino-US trade relations through the granting of PNTR, and reduced external 
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pressure for further reform. Initial external observations of China’s compliance record 
were relatively positive. To be sure, there were calls for China to do more, but while the 
glass was not full, most portrayed it as being half full rather than half empty (USCBC, 
2002; USGAO, 2002; Dong 2002).  
 
However, criticisms of China’s compliance became louder and more fierce in 2003, a 
Presidential election year in the USA. In July 2003, US Secretary of Commerce Donald 
Evans issued a stinging attack on China’s compliance record, complaining about the slow 
pace of reduction trade barriers and government subsidies to domestic producers, and 
lack of action over copyright infringement. And what was particularly striking in this 
attack was the language used - ‘We're going to be taking aggressive action. They need to 
be doing more. They need to be doing much more.’ (Bloomberg, 2003: 12). Evans’ 
assistant, William Lash graded China at only a ‘gentleman's C to a D+’ grade on WTO 
implementation in 2003, while in the annual report to congress, the USTRO noted that 
implementation ‘lost a significant amount of momentum’ in 2003, and this could no 
longer just be put down to ‘start up problems’ (McGarvey, 2004). 
 
In calling for the introduction of restrictions on textile imports from China, Lindsey 
Graham, Republican Senator for South Carolina justified his calls by saying that, ‘I have 
long maintained that China cheats on trade agreements. The practices of Chinese 
companies and the policies of the Chinese government are illegal and give them an unfair 
advantage’ (Barboza, 2003). Through foreign investment in China, often via 
intermediaries in East Asia, US companies themselves are actually the source of some of 
 21
the textiles that Graham was complaining about. But the complexities of global 
production networks are probably not that relevant for the 270,000 textile and apparel 
workers, about a quarter of the US workforce in these sectors, that lost their jobs in the 
space of two years (Barboza, 2003). While the issue is imports for the textile industry, 
lack of access to the Chinese market is the issue for the US semiconductor industry as 
Chinese producers receive rebates to the value of 80% of value-added tax on 
semiconductors (LA Times, 2004). 
 
These complaints have been given impetus by the way that the value of the Renminbi is 
pegged to a fixed price with an otherwise depreciating dollar. Thus, those critical of the 
influx of imports from China argue that there has been a  quasi devaluation of the RMB, 
making imports from China ever cheaper in real terms. The Renminbi-dollar peg was not 
negotiated away when China joined the WTO. So unlike the issue of tax rebates in the 
semiconductor industry, the US cannot prepare a case for judication in the WTO. But 
Section 301 of the US 1974 Trade Act, trade barriers can be introduced if an exporting 
country is ‘unreasonably’ harming the US economy10. And it is this domestic legislation 
that the Fair Currency Alliance targeted as a means of enforcing China to remove the 
Renminbi-dollar peg.  
 
Level One Heading - Globalisation and the Chinese State:  
What does this tell us? On one level, the above section discussing WTO implementation 
suggests that the Chinese state has been less influenced by the liberalisation agenda than 
we might have expected in 2001, not least because WTO reforms have been slow and/or 
 22
partial in implementation. On another, it suggests that Chinese hopes that WTO entry 
would bring an end to trade disputes with the US and guarantee market access have not 
been realised. Indeed, if anything, the fact that hoped for gains have not always 
materialised for has actually heightened demands in the US for the government to 
become more aggressive in its dealings with China.  
 
Though realists might point to the negotiations as an exercise in the promotion of 
national interests in a game of mercantilist competition, perhaps more than anything the 
negotiations draw out the complexities of identifying the ‘national’ interest. The 
negotiations instead seem to point to state actors on all sides acting on behalf of specific 
groups and interests, and highlight the interplay between the domestic and the 
international. In this respect, liberal and gramscian approaches share much in common, as 
they both conceive of the state acting on behalf of a sub-set of national actors in 
international relations. Where thy differ, of course, is in their considerations of what 
constitutes this subset of actors, and in their assessments of the consequences of such 
processes. For liberals the virtuous promotion of political change resulting in the 
intellectual, moral and social  improvement and world ‘democratic’ peace. For critical 
theorists, the imposition of the hegemony of the neo-liberal hegemonic project benefiting 
‘the most powerful corporate economic forces’ (Cox, 1999: 12). 
 
Although many of the actors involved have invoked the liberal approach, there is also 
much to gain from deploying gramscian approaches to understanding the dynamics of 
change in China. On one level, the internal process of change has been promoted by what 
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Leslie Sklair (1995: 135-6) terms ‘globalising state bureaucrats’, who might also be 
considered as constituting a party-state comprador class. This group, epitomised by the 
policies of Zhu Rongji, is engaged in a process of making the investment regime within 
China more and more liberalised and ‘attractive’ to international capital, and reforming 
the domestic economic structure to reduce domestic protectionism, and institute a more 
neoliberal economic paradigm. On another level, Gill (1995: 415) argues that ‘the US 
government is using access to its vast market as a lever of power, linked to a reshaping of 
the international business climate, by subjecting other nations to the disciplines of the 
new constitutionalism, whilst largely refusing to submit to them itself.’. Although writing 
in 1995, and not considering China here at all, Gill could have been describing a key 
element of China’s WTO accession. 
 
But if Cox (1999: 12) is right in arguing that ‘States now by and large play the role of 
agencies of the global political economy, with the task of adjusting national economic 
policies and practices to the perceived exigencies of global economic liberalism’ then we 
should also focus on China’s dependence on exports as the main source of growth in 
recent years. The desire to attract investment to massive policy changes in some areas as 
Chinese state actors have become facilitators for globalisation. Economic zones do not 
create themselves, they are created by administrative fiat; tariffs do not get lowered or 
disappear on their own; ports and railways do not build themselves; and tax breaks do not 
occur without government intervention. As the German Budestag (2001) report on 
globalization forcefully argued, ‘The growing worldwide integration of economies came 
not by any law of nature – it has been the result of active and deliberate policies’. 
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 And once more, we are drawn back to the role of local state actors. The overarching 
changes that have facilitated China’s insertion into the global economy have come from 
central government decisions. But the specific incentives offered to adjust policies and 
practices to the exigencies of global capitalism are largely in the hands of local actors. 
Indeed, there is considerable internal competition within China to attract investment to 
promote export growth (not to mention competition from other regional states deploying 
export oriented growth strategies) (Head and Ries, 1996). This quote Braunstein and 
Epstein (2002: 27) based on an interview with an official in Dalian aptly sums up the 
level of competition: 
 ‘We asked him, ‘Who is your greatest competitor when it comes to trying to 
attract foreign investment?’ expecting the answer to be Vietnam, or Malaysia or, 
perhaps, Beijing. But his answer startled us: ‘Our biggest competitor is the export 
processing zone down the street.’  Not only does one province or one town 
compete with another; but in China, there are numerous zones – export processing 
zones, high tech zones, industrial zones – all of which compete for foreign 
investment. The result is cut throat competition.’ 
The initial decisions may have been internally generated based on conceptions of the best 
way of attaining growth. But once taken, the external dynamic becomes ever more 
important, as the logic of competition in the global political economy begins to take hold. 
 
Conclusions 
In many respects, China’s insertion into the global economy has achieved what it was 
meant to achieve. Jobs and growth have been created by encouraging a foreign funded 
export drive, while key domestic sectors have been largely protected from the pressures 
of global competition, allowing the government to deal with the huge task of domestic 
reform without simultaneously dealing with the added complexity of external pressure. 
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To be sure not everything has played out as the leadership might have wanted it to. The 
extent to which exports are reliant on imported components means that the hoped or 
upgrading of domestic industries in the supply chain has largely not occurred. This has 
resulted in an increasing separation of the export oriented internationalised economy 
from the rest of the domestic Chinese economy.  
 
As an overwhelming majority of exports are produced in China’s coastal provinces, rapid 
export growth combined with problems related to domestic restructuring have 
exacerbated existing problems of uneven regional patterns of growth. And even those 
who predict a very rosy economy future for China in the wake of WTO entry accept that 
inequality might increase in the short to medium term with possible greater poverty for 
some in rural areas (Kawai and Bhattasali, 2001: 11). 
 
The Chinese state is far from an impotent bystander as the tides of global neo-liberal 
capitalism wash over the Chinese economy. Strong elements of state control remain in 
place. The unashamedly pro-neoliberal Heritage Foundation ranks China out 127th out of 
157 countries in a league table of economic freedom – and ranks China as less free in 
2003 than before China joined the WTO in 2000 11 . And even when the central 
government attempts to reduce some of this state power, local power holders can and do 
step in to find new means of imposing control.  
 
But this does not mean that insertion into the global economy has had no impact on the 
functioning of state power in China. As this paper has shown, important changes have 
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occurred as a consequence of three major factors; the perceived necessity of attracting 
foreign investment to spur export growth, the specific concessions agreed in order to join 
the WTO, and the changed conception amongst some Chinese leaders over the long term 
benefits of embracing neo-liberalism  and promoting domestic reform.  
 
Crucially, many of the changes that have occurred have impacted on the domestic 
balance of power and relationships within China itself. As Sassen (1999: 167) has 
argued, one the key impacts of globalisation is the reorganisation of domestic state 
institutions to manage or at least respond to new challenges. This paper has placed an 
emphasis on the relationship between national and local state actors in China, and the 
extent to which global processes play a part in reconfiguring these relationships. But even 
just at the national level, considerable changes are taking place. In March 2003, ‘amid 
intensified global market competition brought about by economic integration around the 
world’ (China Daily, 2003) the National People’s Congress scrapped the State Economic 
and Trade Commission, which primarily had responsibility for the domestic economy, 
and merged it with Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation to form a new 
Ministry of Commerce. There have also been proposals to scrap the constitutional 
definition of China as a ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’ as this ‘contradicts the spirit 
of the World Trade Organization and the requirements of globalization’ (Lam, 2003). Of 
course, it would be entirely wrong to place the origin of all of these changes on external 
impacts and insertion into the global economy. But even within the CCP constitution 
there is a recognition of the importance of the global for domestic change: 
Reform and opening up are the only way to make our country strong. We must 
carry out fundamental reform of the economic structure that hampers the 
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development of the productive forces, and keep and improve a socialist market 
economy; we must also carry out corresponding political restructuring and reform 
in other fields. The opening up means all-dimensional opening up, both externally 
and internally. We must expand economic and technological exchanges and 
cooperation with other countries, make more and better use of foreign capital, 
resources and technologies, and assimilate and exploit the achievements of all 
other cultures, including all the advanced modes of operation and methods of 
management of developed countries in the West 
 
 
In November 2002, the CCP amended its constitution. As a consequence, the CCP is no 
longer just the vanguard of the proletariat, but of ‘Chinese People and the Chinese 
nation’ Party rule is no longer just based on Marxism Leninism Mao Zedong Thought, 
but now also on Jiang Zemin’s theory of the ‘Three Represents’ 三个袋便 - the Party 
must always represents China's advanced productive forces, China's advanced culture, 
and ‘the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people’. In 
truth, few people in China are really concerned about how the party theoretically justifies 
its oversight of economic reform as long as that economic reform is bringing tangible 
economic results. It is not so much what the party says as what it delivers that conditions 
popular attitude to its continued grip on power. However the Three Represents is 
significant as it marks the official recognition that the fundamental basis of CCP rule, and 
thus the fundamental basis of the Chinese political regime, has changed. The 
authoritarian modernising elite that now rules China has largely emerged as a response to 
internal change. But the structure of power, and crucially, the freedom to pursue national 
developments strategies, has been significantly influenced by China’s insertion into the 
global economy. Using Laswell’s definition of politics, “who gets what” and who is able 
to control “who gets what” are very different in contemporary China than they were 
before 1993. 
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1  Coates (2000), for example, concentrates on a comparison between the US, Sweden, Germany and 
the UK, while Crouch and Streeck (1997) similarly consider Italy, Sweden, the UK, France, the 
US and Japan. A similar tripartite analysis of Europe-the US-Japan is also evident in Berger and 
Dore (1996). 
2  The increase in the total revenue base can only be explained by either previous lax tax collection, 
or the deliberate underreporting of local fiscal revenues to avoid making remittances to the central 
authorities 
3  Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen and Shenzhen. Hainan Island was later added as the fifth.  
4  The Chinese currency is officially the Renminbi Yuan. Renminbi is the name of the currency – the 
equivalent of saying sterling - while Yuan is the denomination - the equivalent of saying Pound. 
Just to confuse matters, virtually nobody in China uses the official term ‘Yuan’ preferring instead 
the colloquial ‘kuai’. 
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5  Unless indicated to the contrary, the data used in this paper has been provided from the Institutue 
of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and I thank Yu 
Yongding and Wang Yizhou for providing access to this information.  
6  The domestic economy grew slightly in 2003 for the first time in three years.   
7  There are two terms for hegemony in Chinese. 盟主权 meng zhu quan  literally means the power 
to lead an alliance. The more commonly used term is 霸权 baquan. 霸 ba was used to refer to the 
feudal princes who ruled by force, and carries connotations of despotism and tyranny. 
8  The second volume, ‘China Still Can Say No中国还能可以说不’ was an altogether more vitriolic 
diatribe against Japan (apparently in response to readers comments that the earlier volume had not 
been sufficiently harsh on Japan) which more or less treated the Japanese as sub-humans or at 
least uncivilised.  
9  She said that they all obviously knew what the WTO was using the term 知道zhidao but didn’t了
解liaojie the WTO which implies a deep understanding. 
10  See also section 201, which allows for barriers to be introduced where ‘serious injury’ occurs 
even if there is nothing unfair about the trade policies of the state causing this ‘serious injury’. 
11  On individual criteria, with 5 represented the lowest levels of freedom, China scores a 5 for trade 
policy, 4 for government intervention, 4 for restrictions on foreign investment, 3 for wages and 
prices, 4 for regulation, 2 for fiscal burden, 1 for monetary policy due to the very low levels of 
inflation, 4 for Banking and Finance, 4 for property rights, and 3.5 for black market activities. See 
http://cf.heritage.org/index/country.cfm?ID=30.0 
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